Published on: 2014-10-08T10:19:10+00:00
The discussion revolves around the rationality of miners in the Bitcoin network. It is suggested that prioritizing short-term profits over the overall health of the system can lead to potential attacks on the network. However, as the mining arms race slows down, miners may become more settled in their approach.In an email exchange, Gregory Maxwell discusses the potential issue of anonymous double-spends in Bitcoin. He proposes a method to prevent double-spends by locking fraudulent spends one block higher and relying on miners to choose to take kickback payments. If someone were to modify bitcoind to make this choice automatic, then DECOR+ would be the only solution to avoid anonymous double-spends with chained kickbacks.Sergio Lerner proposes a solution to the freeze problem in cryptocurrency transactions called "FRONT" or automatic fee-sharing. However, he notes that this solution creates the risk of double-spending through a process called "CHAKIDO." The ability for miners to roll forward fees does not make this situation any worse since transactions can also roll forward fees.Tom Harding and Sergio Lerner discuss rational self-interest in Bitcoin mining. Lerner argues that competing for high-fee transactions would be the most profitable strategy, but Harding points out that this strategy only works if one miner has a fixed advantage. The solution to this problem is the DECOR+ protocol, which shares block rewards between miners at the same height until coinbase maturity is over.The context discusses an ORBS attack or an attempt to form an ad-hoc coalition for a fork. The worry about times when block subsidy is low is unwarranted as the cost of proof-of-work creates a lower bound to the incentive that needs to be offered. Disallowing the implementation of rational mining is not a viable option, as anyone can implement whatever optimization they think is profitable and within the rules.In an email thread, Alex Mizrahi proposes a solution to sharing unusually large transaction fees without the need for protocol changes. However, Sergio Lerner points out that this solution could be used for an attack called CHAKIDO. Sergio suggests alternative protections to address this issue.The problem of creating an arbitrary fee can arise due to a bug or accident in defective wallet software. Miners could be incentivized to collect these huge fees, which might provide a higher incentive than the block subsidy on the trunk. This could trigger a long battle of ad-hoc coalitions. Addressing the known bug of the signature hash would have positive effects for resource-limited hardware wallets.The discussion is about the stability of a blockchain system when the block size is lower than the offered demand, resulting in a backlog. The poster expresses skepticism that such a situation can ever be stable because people typically do not want their transactions to be stuck in the backlog. An idea from TierNolan suggests that a miner who owns 1/N of the total hashrate must choose between two strategies based on the last known block's claimed large transaction fee.Jorge Timón discusses the eventual disappearance of mining subsidies for Bitcoin and how transaction fees will become higher than these subsidies. He proposes a hypothetical scenario where Bitcoin would have initially come with a set of nlocktimed transactions that pay fees for each block from the start until the subsidy disappears.In an email exchange, the idea of formalizing the proportion of "rational" vs "honest"/"altruistic" participants in the network is discussed. It is suggested that if there is a significant amount of honest hashrate refusing to aid greedy behavior, then such a strategy becomes a loser even for purely greedy participants. The email exchange also touches on income tradeoffs for different amounts of altruism and convergence problems that may arise if altruistic participants attempt to punish forkers.Gregory Maxwell points out tools that could be helpful for Bitcoin transactions. He suggests using the BLS short signature scheme to help secure transactions. He explains how this scheme can prevent censorship and provide anti-censorship properties.Sergio Lerner shares a vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol called "The Freeze on Transaction Problem." Some tools are discussed to address this problem, such as locktime on normal transactions, block commitments in transactions, and fee forwarding. However, these tools do not completely solve the concern. Sergio suggests formalizing the analysis of the proportion of the network that is rational versus honest or altruistic.In an email exchange, it is pointed out that the freeze on transaction problem is non-existent currently because of preventive measures implemented in the latest versions of bitcoind. The best solution is for the community to cooperate and share high transaction fees. Alternatively, modifying the Bitcoin protocol to automatically share fees in a sliding window could provide a way for miners to cooperate anonymously.Overall, the discussions highlight various challenges and potential solutions related to rationality of miners, double-spending, transaction fees, network stability, and vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T10:24:04.550724+00:00