Author: Tamas Blummer 2014-10-06 13:29:15
Published on: 2014-10-06T13:29:15+00:00
The context discusses an ORBS attack or an attempt to form an ad-hoc coalition for a fork. The preparation step includes adding a transaction between two of own addresses in every block, which miners can do at zero cost in their own blocks. The execution involves embedding a transaction double spending the regular transaction with one that offers a high fee into the preferred fork, offering an incentive for rational miners to join the ad-hoc coalition for that fork. Anyone can attempt to form an ad-hoc coalition using these steps, but it is cheaper and easier for miners. The worry about times when block subsidy is low is unwarranted as the cost of proof-of-work creates a lower bound to the incentive that needs to be offered. The author believes that disallowing the implementation of rational mining is not a viable option, as anyone can implement whatever optimization they think is profitable and within the rules.
Updated on: 2023-06-09T02:58:45.029802+00:00