Published on: 2011-08-05T13:19:23+00:00
During a discussion in 2011, Bitcoin developers explored the idea of optimizing the transaction forwarding process to make attacks less effective. Gavin Andresen and Andy Parkins suggested randomizing the relay order of outgoing transactions and adding a random delay between each forward. This would make it difficult for attackers to determine if a transaction came directly from the originator or through a fast path. However, they did not propose major changes to the transport protocol or implementing onion routing.Christian Decker expressed his belief that anonymity should not be the main focus of Bitcoin developers. He argued that the core of the protocol is about secure and fast transactions, not complete anonymity. Decker acknowledged that TOR already provides a good option for those seeking anonymity and that network analysis can break anonymity in Bitcoin. Another developer agreed, suggesting that layering Bitcoin over Tor/I2P would be better than trying to replicate an onion network within Bitcoin itself. They believed that doing anonymity right is challenging and should be left to the Tor/I2P experts. However, both developers agreed that the client/network should be made more resistant against DDoS attacks.Gavin Andresen proposed a mechanism for deanonymizing Bitcoin in which every node connects to the cloud through sweeping/IRC/get_peers messages. The first IP address consistently relaying transactions for a specific identity would be identified as that identity. Randomizing the transaction forwarding process would make it difficult for even a massively connected monitor to determine if it received a transaction from the originator or through a fast path.In an email exchange among developers in August 2011, one developer argued that while anonymity and pseudonymity are nice features, they should not be the primary focus of Bitcoin developers. They emphasized the importance of secure and fast transactions and mentioned that TOR already provides anonymity options. The thread also discussed the possibility of every node doing resends, implementing a TOR-like tunneling system, and using UDP packets with spoofed sender addresses. However, the reliability of these ideas was questioned, and another developer mentioned the implementation of TCP over UDP called UTP as a potential solution.There was a suggestion that recipients re-broadcast transactions, potentially allowing for the identification of both senders and receivers. This could be used to track down stolen coins or discover the IP address associated with a recipient Bitcoin address, provided a client with the private key occasionally connects to the network. The email thread also discussed security testing on the Bitcoin network, including the vulnerability to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and the challenges of ensuring connectivity and anonymity.Dan Kaminsky discussed potential security vulnerabilities in Bitcoin at the Black Hat 2011 conference. Although details were limited, there was mention of a tool called "blitcoin" that could reveal both sides of a Bitcoin transaction. However, it should be noted that Bitcoin transactions are already publicly visible, so this tool did not seem to present a true vulnerability. Further information about blitcoin and other potential security risks in the Bitcoin network was scarce at the time.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T02:12:53.292584+00:00