Author: Mats Jerratsch 2015-10-19 07:45:34
Published on: 2015-10-19T07:45:34+00:00
The concern here is the security of the lightning network against attackers, who can trick users into their network with no cost via systematic attacks. It is possible for an attacker to MITM a user's internet connection and build a large network locally that directs all payments to the same node. This type of attack is difficult to detect without checking the blockchain for all of the network's anchors. The security of the network depends on knowing public keys of nodes connected to it. To make it more challenging to attack the system in this way, it would be best to make it expensive to do so.Anthony Towns suggests that if there are many vandal nodes on the network, selecting a good one is like picking a ball out of a bag. He says that opening channels with randomly chosen nodes can help find good ones. The probability of finding a good node increases as the number of random nodes increases. Although running unreliable nodes requires more effort than legitimate ones, it is still possible for attackers to play by the rules and forward all payments up to a point where they stop. If an attacker connects everyone to their nodes, they can relay all payments but identify payee and payer, even with onion routing. However, getting everyone to connect to their nodes will require them to run the majority of nodes on the network. This may result in an arms race among organizations running lightning nodes, leading to a scaling problem if routing doesn't work adequately. One solution is to create a cost to run or register a node/channel, thereby discouraging spamming of the list of channels with valid looking edges that won't route payments successfully.
Updated on: 2023-05-23T21:00:26.122258+00:00