Published on: 2019-11-16T03:43:58+00:00
In response to Subhra's query, ZmnSCPxj explains that while it is indeed possible for malicious parties to engage in such behaviors, it does not pose a significant problem for other nodes. He points out that payers will prefer a single node over the aggregate nodes and that the two parties cannot steal from other nodes or steal routing. Furthermore, they cannot advertise a channel without disclosing its funding location on the chain due to antispam reasons. Therefore, as long as the malicious parties are cooperating between themselves, this behavior does not harm other nodes.Moving on to another topic, Subhra raises a concern about the potential issue of misreporting channel balances by nodes in a cluster. Specifically, he questions whether nodes B and C in a cluster might misreport their channel balances, potentially leading to economic inefficiencies. In response, ZmnSCPxj clarifies that there is no facility to remotely report channel balances and emphasizes that the exact balance on the BC channel is not particularly important. He argues that if nodes B and C are part of the same economic entity, the BC channel is essentially equivalent to that entity keeping funds on a hot online wallet. Subhra then extends the discussion by asking whether increasing the cluster size from B->C to B->C->X->Y->Z would pose a problem. ZmnSCPxj dismisses this concern, stating that such long chains are economically irrational behavior and will be selected against. He explains that anyone creating such a chain would lose out on earnings compared to having multiple nodes creating the shortest paths between many nodes. Additionally, if fees between nodes A and D become too high, they may choose to open a direct channel between them instead of relying on the long chain, which would undermine the earning potential of the aggregate nodes B, C, X, Y, and Z. Overall, ZmnSCPxj believes that economic rationality will lead to the routing around of such attacks.In summary, while there are possibilities for malicious behavior in payment channel networks, such as reporting incorrect residual balances or opening low-value channels that exceed their capacity, these actions do not pose significant problems for other nodes as long as the parties involved cooperate amongst themselves. Furthermore, ZmnSCPxj emphasizes that economic rationality will ultimately discourage and route around such behaviors.
Updated on: 2023-07-31T22:22:47.947963+00:00