Author: Joost Jager 2019-11-07 14:33:00
Published on: 2019-11-07T14:33:00+00:00
The conversation revolves around the implementation of a new commitment format for lightning network channels. The initial proposal was to use a single "to_self_delay" value, but this was opposed by some parties who wanted flexibility and distinct values. There was a discussion about the possibility of negotiation during the opening phase of the channel, but it was agreed that it is an accept or error situation. However, a unification proposal was suggested to use the maximum of the two settings. The idea of using anchor outputs was discussed, and it was suggested that both anchors should always have equal values and be paid for by the initiator. There were concerns raised about the possibility of insufficient fees, which could result in stuck channels. It was suggested that payment for the anchors should be made before fees to mitigate this issue. The idea of using a hard-coded constant for dustRelayFee was opposed since it would not be adaptable to changes. It was also suggested that each side should pay for its own anchor output and avoid paying for a fundee-anchor if the fundee has no skin in the game. However, there were concerns raised about the possibility of abuse. A suggestion was made to rotate the anchors and nothing else, which would reduce on-chain spam if someone lost their keys. Another proposal was to reuse the funding keys for the anchor output, which allows anyone to spend after confirmation.
Updated on: 2023-05-25T17:49:49.557403+00:00