Author: Cezary Dziemian 2018-11-23 19:34:38
Published on: 2018-11-23T19:34:38+00:00
In a discussion thread on the Lightning-dev mailing list, Cezary Dziemian sought clarification on how commitment and penalty transactions work in Lightning Network. He referred to an article he had read that explained how a child transaction containing one's signature and secret is required to claim former channel partner funds. This secret serves as evidence that the partner did not commit the last transaction. Cezary was unsure whether this graph was an accurate representation of how commitment and penalty transactions are developed. In response, René Pickhardt provided insights into the issue of unilateral (force) close, stating that RBF would require a signature of one's former channel partner, which may be unlikely to obtain if force close was initiated. Additionally, CPFP would necessitate spending one's output, which may not be possible because there is a timelock on it. However, for BOLT 1.1, a third output in commitment transactions would be added, which anyone can spend (OP_TRUE) and which has no timelock so that anyone can use CPFP. The output would have no value except as a fee for miners who could collect it.
Updated on: 2023-06-02T15:00:30.256307+00:00