Author: ZmnSCPxj 2018-11-07 10:49:21
Published on: 2018-11-07T10:49:21+00:00
In a discussion on the Lightning-dev mailing list, ZmnSCPxj raised concerns about allowing nodes to request more liquidity than they put into a channel. ZmnSCPxj argued that allowing an initiator to request arbitrary capacity would create a dangerous situation in which attackers could spin up temporary Lightning nodes and lock up funds, resulting in lost potential earnings for the victim. However, a counterpoint was made that if the fee for liquidity is high enough, it may not matter whether the attacker uses the locked funds or not, as the victim has already been paid. Another potential attack scenario involves advertising available liquidity, receiving payment for locking funds into a channel, and then immediately closing the channel without delivering the liquidity. To address this, ZmnSCPxj suggested modifying channel commitment transactions with an `nSequence` that prevents them from being claimed for a month or so. The discussion highlights the importance of considering potential attack scenarios when allowing nodes to advertise liquidity and the need for protocol modifications to mitigate these risks. Overall, allowing nodes to advertise liquidity creates a market of inbound capacity and paves the way for automated node re-balancing, reducing the amount of out-of-band negotiation needed to obtain inbound capacity. Credit was given to Casey Rodamor for the initial idea.
Updated on: 2023-05-25T15:24:32.722683+00:00