Payment channel without timeout protected from malleability



Summary:

The email thread discusses a way to open a channel without suffering from malleability attack. It is suggested by adapting an idea from gmaxwell, which requires A to ask B pubkey and then create the first commitment transaction. A extracts the hash that B needs to sign to be able to broadcast the commitment and then asks B to sign the hash but does not disclose the commitment. After broadcasting the anchor and confirmation, A announces the anchor to B. However, there are some concerns raised regarding the process. Firstly, 'without timeout' is only possible with OP_CSV - not naturally with what we have currently. Secondly, to build a valid payment channel on top of the anchor, B has to be sure that A cannot get her money back at any point in the future. Lastly, while this is a fair setup already, it does only protect against targeted attacks against a specific transaction, leaving a chance for someone to lose money doing that.


Updated on: 2023-05-23T21:44:42.000461+00:00