Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-05-19 00:52:09
Published on: 2020-05-19T00:52:09+00:00
The message discusses the potential mitigation of an attack on the Lightning Network. The suggested solution involves negotiating a new `max_dust_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` enforced by the HTLC recipient, which expresses its maximum trust tolerance with regards to dust. A cost on the HTLC holder would also make the attack more expensive, although a different order of magnitude may be needed for spam-protection efficiency. In the absence of a spec change, a forwarding node can refuse to forward an HTLC once a certain level of incoming dust HTLCs are currently in-flight. However, this leads to reduced reliability on micropayments. Adding this to the spec has the advantage that an honest forwarder can hold an HTLC for a while once it notices that the next hop has a bunch of dusty HTLCs in-flight that are beyond the negotiated `max_dust_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, which might help reliability of micropayments slightly.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T01:26:45.752227+00:00