Author: ZmnSCPxj 2018-05-16 09:44:35
Published on: 2018-05-16T09:44:35+00:00
The conversation discusses how an attacker can manipulate the reputation of nodes in a payment channel network by routing payments that stall, thus degrading the reputation of the victim node. However, it is noted that this should be costly for the attacker because they must compensate the victim node for making itself vulnerable to payment delays. The system is designed with the assumption that defending an anonymous/decentralized network that allows sybils is best achieved by pricing resource utilization appropriately. On the other hand, rich nodes may victimize poorer nodes by arranging the network such that only the rich node can practically earn from forwarding fees, with everyone else suspicious of each other except the rich node. The behavior of reputation in case of successful and failed payments is also discussed. In the case of successful payments, the upstream reputation is increased by the fee earned, while the downstream reputation is decreased by T * reputation_loss_rate. If the payment fails after T time, the downstream reputation is decreased by T * reputation_loss_rate, but the upstream reputation remains unchanged.
Updated on: 2023-05-25T00:41:08.342974+00:00