Author: ZmnSCPxj 2018-03-19 14:27:00
Published on: 2018-03-19T14:27:00+00:00
The conversation is regarding the security of Lightning Network (LN) transactions. The payee-determined route section starting from an introduction point protects the payee from being located by the payer, but if the payer contacts the payee using IP or non-.onion hostname, then there is no point in hiding from the payer. However, if the payee has a LN node that is 100% a TOR hidden service, and you don't use a partially payee-determined route, the payee has to reveal its node ID to the payer. This is not the same as revealing the physical identity of the payee, and having a hidden service may help to keep the two identities separated, but a LN node is a relatively long-lived entity. LN nodes need to communicate with counterparties, and if the connection breaks, one needs to get in contact again, else the channel is unuseable. Although an LN node may change its TOR address by re-gossiping a new TOR address, it still links LN pubkeys with TOR addresses anyway. The use-case here could be that the payee uses many TOR addresses with only one LN node. Onion routing on LN, in general, protects the payer and the payee from being known easily by intermediate hop nodes.
Updated on: 2023-05-24T21:40:32.342754+00:00