Blinded Paths Doom Scenario



Summary:

In a discussion between Tony and Bastien, they talk about the deanonymizing techniques used on the Lightning Network (LN). Tony mentions that these techniques only allow the recipient to be deanonymized, not the sender. He also brings up the scenario of a major LSP (Lightning Service Provider) with direct routes to every node and end users with unannounced channels opened to them. Tony points out that with Phoenix, Acinq is aware of the sender and destination for every outbound payment and knows the destination for every inbound payment.Bastien responds by saying that this issue has nothing to do with blinded paths and doesn't change with them. He explains that when using a mobile wallet, the nodes you are connected to know that you are the sender/recipient when they forward an HTLC (Hash Time-Locked Contract) to/from you because it can't be hidden that you're using a mobile phone. However, he argues that blinded paths can help in this situation because a mobile wallet using trampoline won't have to reveal the payment destination, only the blinded path introduction node.Tony then explains that there are multiple deanonymizing techniques on LN today, such as timing and CLTV (CheckLockTimeVerify). He also mentions the possibility of a major LSP with direct routes to every node and end users with unannounced channels opened to them. He highlights that Acinq is aware of the sender and destination for every outbound payment and knows the destination for every inbound payment with Phoenix. Tony further explains that if there's an unannounced channel with one of the hops in the blinded route, it can ruin the privacy of the end users if those blinded hops are colluding.Bastien responds by stating that the privacy of the sender is preserved by the hops before the introduction point. He argues that while there may be weak anti-correlation mechanisms in routing payments, the sender's identity is still protected. He explains that even if the payments go through regulated nodes, intermediate nodes have no way of knowing how close they are to the sender.The discussion continues with Tony expressing his concern about the potential downside of blinded paths for privacy and decentralization on the network. He suggests that blinded paths could be used to enforce that "compliant" nodes are the only ways to reach a given destination. This would bypass the pleb routing nodes and force users to route only through large regulated hubs. Tony also raises concerns that this could hurt sender-side privacy, as closely connected compliant nodes may be able to track a payment through basic timing analysis.Overall, the discussion revolves around the deanonymizing techniques on LN, the role of blinded paths in preserving privacy, and the potential implications for privacy and decentralization on the network. It highlights the trade-offs and challenges involved in achieving privacy while ensuring payment reliability and compliance with regulations.


Updated on: 2023-07-28T02:11:00.613022+00:00