Author: ZmnSCPxj 2019-07-14 23:22:43
Published on: 2019-07-14T23:22:43+00:00
The email exchange discusses various challenges in the Lightning Network protocol and proposes solutions. Firstly, a proposed signature (sig(A, hash_type=SINGLE|ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT|NONE) sig(P, hash_type=SINGLE)) to identify Alice as the culprit is deemed flawed as Alice can simply sign `sig(A, hash_type=ALL)` instead at this stage since she is the only signatory to the `OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY`. The suggestion of using `MuSig(A, B, C)` instead would complicate things as it requires performing `n` such rituals where `n` is the number of participants. The idea of using a hash/preimage challenge is proposed where each participant would reveal an identifying hash on channel opening with a preimage that only each participant knows. This will be used to restrict which Taproot script they can use to perform a unilateral close, thus identifying which participant initiated the unilateral close. In response to criticism regarding the Decker-Russell-Osuntokun system lowering the cost for a malicious party to test monitoring of the chain, it is noted that the toxic-waste problem is inherent to punishment schemes, and anything we build on top of it would reintroduce asymmetry, undoing many of the benefits gained with eltoo. It is suggested that punishments are not ideal in the first place. While access to a channel database without necessarily accessing node private keys is often easier, an attacker would still need access to the keys to add their own signature. Current Poon-Dryja requires a reserve of 1% of the channel total value maintained by each participant as an amount that can be used to punish a thief. If the fee needed in Decker-Russell-Osuntokun is at or above 1% of the channel value, the fee lost would be larger than what a thief would risk under Poon-Dryja. Finally, a node could refuse incoming channel open requests for Decker-Russell-Osuntokun that are larger than 100 times the typical fee for a 1-input 1-output transaction while still getting similar protection to Poon-Dryja using the de facto standard 1% reserve.
Updated on: 2023-06-02T19:21:57.504892+00:00