Author: Jeremy Rubin 2022-02-19 00:38:27
Published on: 2022-02-19T00:38:27+00:00
The message is discussing a new type of pinning attack that is distinct from other types. The definition of pinning is given as sequences of transactions that prevent or make it less likely for progress to be made in terms of units of computation proceeding. It is stated that something that only increases the possibility of making progress cannot be considered pinning. Instead, it may be called "necromancing", which involves bringing back transactions that would otherwise be fee irrational.The author argues that necromancy should not be a concern, and if a protocol is vulnerable to it, then the protocol is insecure and should not hinder Bitcoin's forward progress on secure applications to service already insecure ones. Lightning is designed to be necromancy resistant but pinning vulnerable, as are things like coinjoins. Necromancy is also not uniquely un-present in Bitcoin today, and things like package relay and elimination of pinning are inherently at odds with making necromancy either for CPFP use cases.Regarding a specific use case mentioned by the recipient, where a third party could mess up OpenTimestamps calendars by delaying the mining of timestamp transactions, the author states that this is incorrect. A third party can only accelerate the mining of timestamp transactions, but they can accelerate the mining of any such transaction. The interference is limited by how much the user wishes to pay to guarantee their commitment is in the current block rather than the next. Additionally, out-of-band transaction fees can be used to achieve a similar effect, and if the attack were valuable, it could happen today.Finally, if a user gets necromanced on an earlier RBF'd transaction by a third party for OTS, it should be viewed as a positive because it cost less in fees overall since the undoing of the later RBF returned some satoshis to the wallet.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T07:13:28.748089+00:00