On massive channel closing and fee bumping [combined summary]



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Published on: 2020-02-28T20:04:42+00:00


Summary:

In an email conversation between Gleb Naumenko and Ariard, various aspects of the Lightning Network (LN) implementation are discussed in relation to massive channel closing. One of the main concerns raised is the issue of fee rates and the potential for low-fee rate commitment transactions to not be included in network mempools during mempool fee rate surges or due to adversarial or irresponsive counterparties.To address this concern, dynamic single-party fee-bumping of their own commitment transaction through CPFP/package relay is suggested as a possible solution. However, this approach raises concerns about violating the Initiator Pays principle. The email also mentions that the reserve system and the channel-funder-pays-closing-fee mechanism can help deter attacks, and removing the latter could reduce the cost of these attacks.The possibility of provoking a massive channel closing by feeding an invalid block to light clients in the BIP157 paradigm is also highlighted. To better understand the impact of fee spikes and mitigate such attacks, the email suggests conducting empirical studies and simulations based on historical data and parameters such as the number of vulnerable channels, their properties, distribution, and the number of nodes implementing dynamic bumping.Regarding LN light clients, it is recommended that they disable HTLC routing and avoid aggressive fee-bumping. As the LN becomes more integral to the Bitcoin ecosystem, the email emphasizes the need to consider mining-related incentives and risks that can influence protocol development. Understanding the mechanics of attacks and implementing appropriate countermeasures is crucial, especially considering the anticipated heavy use of light clients in the future.Overall, the email discusses the importance of addressing fee rate issues, vulnerabilities, and potential attacks in the LN implementation to ensure the security and effectiveness of the Lightning Network within the Bitcoin ecosystem.


Updated on: 2023-07-31T22:42:38.185754+00:00