Covert channel recovery with Oblivious Signatures



Summary:

The discussion revolves around the possibility of gating part of the proof-of-discrete-log-equivalence through a ZKCP on payment point+scalar, where the proof is provided only on payment. It is mentioned that a secure conditional payment for the proof would always prove the proof existed. However, this is dependent on the proof and a mere ZKCP is not always enough. An example of one pay-for-proof scheme is also given. The post further delves into the security of the protocol for buying an opening of a Pedersen commitment with Bitcoin. The value of proof that the "other node" is in fact the actual "other node" on that channel is discussed, and it is noted that additional information about the "other node" can make this kind of proof very valuable. Another aspect touched upon is the weak consistency of the LN gossip network potentially making it a monolithic database. This raises questions about increasing the consistency of node gossip.


Updated on: 2023-06-03T03:28:55.488273+00:00