Author: ZmnSCPxj 2019-12-10 10:35:58
Published on: 2019-12-10T10:35:58+00:00
In this communication, the author advises Lightning node operators to ensure they have multiple, redundant, trusted methods of receiving Bitcoin block data in a timely fashion. They also mention that delivering header data over the LN wire protocol may be useful if the Bitcoin fullnode used is differently accessible from the Lightning node used, for example, if the Bitcoin fullnode is openly on an IPv4 address while the Lightning node is on a Tor hidden service. The author also discusses how some LN error messages may be triggered at an abnormal rate like `expiry_too_soon` due to a victim using a HTLC base in the past and how a node might engage in background probing of payments that definitely will fail, getting such information that way. Finally, the author details a scenario where Alice is a victim of an eclipse attack and is only connected to nodes controlled by Mallory. In this case, Mallory can simply directly fail payments, allowing them to sidestep certain protections.
Updated on: 2023-06-02T22:09:05.581454+00:00