Author: Jeremy 2021-08-08 22:46:26
Published on: 2021-08-08T22:46:26+00:00
The author of the given text is against increasing the dust limit as it would have a negative impact on current Lightning Channel operators. They suggest that accommodating the worst-case scenario under current consensus rules is better, and using things like Utreexo or similar rather than meddling in users' business can be helpful. The author believes that zero-value outputs are not a real spam problem and should be considered a market problem where people who want them can pay what they are worth for them to have it.In response to Matt's proposal, the author suggests that paying for space via an assurance bond is worse than allowing a zero value input because it might accrue the need for an additional change output to which the bond's collateral is returned. The author states that if someone else decides it's worth sending a remittance of whichever value, it's still not their business.Regarding CT and using range proofs to exclude dust, the author is aware that it can be done but believes that it shrinks the anonymity set and is suspect. However, creating incentives for state clean-up is a decent design space to consider, according to the author.The author proposes setting up a bottle deposit program whereby miners contribute funds from fee revenue to a rolling utxo, and the rolling utxo can either disperse funds to the miner reward or soak up funds from fees in order to encourage blocks with a better ratio of inputs to outputs. Miners can then prioritize transactions that help their block's ratio without directly interfering with users' intent to create whatever outputs they want. The author mentions the Gas Token by Daian et al as an example from Eth, though there can be many pitfalls arbing these state space freeing return curves.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T05:13:26.137500+00:00