Author: Antoine Riard 2020-08-25 18:16:56
Published on: 2020-08-25T18:16:56+00:00
The conversation between Antoine and Zeeman revolves around a potential mechanism to lower trust in zero-conf channel opener. Antoine suggests that the local party can broadcast the funding transaction, ensuring it's well-propagated across network mempools and then start accepting incoming payment on the zero-conf channel. This would increase the level of protection against double-spending HTLCs. However, Zeeman points out that since RBF is opt-in for Bitcoin Core nodes, it is trivial to double-broadcast. A malicious opener could send a high-fee RBF-enabled channel funding transaction to the receiver and at the same time send a conflicting low-fee RBF-disabled transaction that pays the entire channel amount to themselves to all the miners they can find. This could be a security issue unless double-spending of zero-conf chans becomes a real problem. Mapping miners' mempools will be a cost in spying infrastructure and thus make the malicious routing node's job harder, providing a security improvement for zero-conf channels. Overall, this scheme is not worthy of working on unless double-spend of zero-conf chans become a real issue.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T01:58:43.859128+00:00