Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-08-25 02:38:15
Published on: 2020-08-25T02:38:15+00:00
In a conversation between two individuals, Antoine suggests a mechanism to lower trust in zero-conf channel opener. The local party can be in charge of broadcasting the funding transaction, thus ensuring it's well-propagated across network mempools and then start to accept incoming payment on the zero-conf channel. This would provide game-theory security for zero-conf channels, making it more expensive for a malicious opener to double-spend an HTLC than to pay higher fees for replacing the channel funding tx. RBF is opt-in for Bitcoin Core nodes, making it easy for double-broadcasting for conflicting low-fee RBF-disabled transactions. Thus, it is necessary to trust that the other party does not engage in such practices while offering a channel. It is imperative to note that there is no global mempool, and full nodes will only see transactions with fees higher than what they have in their mempool.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T01:57:09.541760+00:00