Author: Rusty Russell 2016-08-09 05:43:57
Published on: 2016-08-09T05:43:57+00:00
In a post, Tadge Dryja discusses the issue of channel utilization in LN, and the problem of states with in-flight HTLCs. He suggests that attackers can still lose money if one ensures that the sum of all HTLCs is less than either non-HTLC balance in the channel. Rusty Russell responds by suggesting that there is a need to capture those HTLCs but argues that it is not as bad as it seems since an HTLC can be described in ~40 bytes. He proposes his method for sending the observer the "steal" tx every update, which gets encrypted+HMAC with the txid of the commit tx or SHA256() of our signature on the commit tx. He suggested that they might want to offer their own peers to do that watching for them for a fee.
Updated on: 2023-05-24T00:13:41.173490+00:00