Author: Anthony Towns 2015-08-21 11:32:50
Published on: 2015-08-21T11:32:50+00:00
In an email exchange on August 21, 2015, Joseph Poon and Anthony Towns discussed a hypothetical scenario in which a group of participants collude to delay transaction notifications to one participant (B) in order to encourage future transactions to deposit funds on C's side of the A/C channel rather than the B/C channel. Poon argued that pending sends between participants in this cartel have a shorter time than those outside the cartel, meaning that CDE links will always have shorter HTLCs in transit than B's. However, Towns was unconvinced, pointing out that if C/D and D/E are fast and reliable, it is desirable to send more transactions their way anyway. Moreover, he questioned why C would bother taking such a significant cost to encourage transactions over A/C rather than simply offering reduced/negative fees. Finally, Towns noted that if onion routing were being used, C/D might not even know who A is and could risk being bypassed entirely if they delay transactions.
Updated on: 2023-05-18T00:25:27.598786+00:00