Loop attack with onion routing..



Summary:

In this email conversation, the discussion is centered around possible collusion between parties involved in a Lightning Network transaction. The conversation notes that C could delay notifying B until near the timeout to achieve the desired outcome without any collusion. However, pending sends between participants in the cartel have shorter times than outside the cartel so that CDE links will always have shorter HTLCs in transit than B's. The purpose of not announcing colluding is to collectively make any paths to C delay closing out the HTLC as long as possible, so that anyone that transacts with C has to wait a long time, which will decrease the incentive to transact with C. If C is being attacked and B is not colluding, then A and B will dislike transacting with C, even though it's not C's fault.


Updated on: 2023-05-23T19:32:43.465996+00:00