Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-04-23 12:46:59
Published on: 2020-04-23T12:46:59+00:00
In a conversation between Matt and ZmnSCPxj, the former suggests that if a miner replaces a high-fee transaction with a low-fee alternative with better feerate to a different address, an economically rational miner will accept the proposal. Even if C hooks a tree of low-fee transactions on its hook output or normal payment, miners will still be willing to confirm this and the B hook CPFP transaction without. The proposal by Matt is that B and C should agree and show the preimage of some hash H. Then they must agree that B provides a signature spending the hashlock branch to a transaction with outputs for normal payment to C and hook outputs to both B and C. B can still not maintain a mempool by broadcasting its timelock transaction and trying to CPFP the above hashlock transaction. If it succeeds, it means the transaction exists and B can claim the A->B HTLC.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T00:54:08.921926+00:00