Proof-of-closure as griefing attack mitigation



Summary:

In an email conversation between Nadav and ZmnSCPxj, they discuss a proposal to close channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream. ZmnSCPxj believes that this proposal adds a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, but still allows for long lock-ups of other's funds with a 10x multiplier if a long route is chosen. While ZmnSCPxj sees this as an improvement, they are unsure if it properly punishes the attacker in its current form. Nadav points out that E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE because it is a self-channel and can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well.


Updated on: 2023-06-03T00:18:25.219290+00:00