Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-04-02 08:05:06
Published on: 2020-04-02T08:05:06+00:00
ZmnSCPxj and Subhra engage in an email exchange discussing the concept of griefing attacks within the context of anonymous multi-hop locks. ZmnSCPxj explains that griefing attacks occur when someone intentionally does not claim or forward an attack. Both sender and receiver control the secrets used in PTLCs, making it impossible for a single entity to control them. However, relying entirely on the sender for sampling the secrets and generating the PTLC could create vulnerabilities if the sender or receiver is corrupted.To increase privacy protection against the sender, they propose having a receiver provide a partial, blinded path. The blinding factors added to the final point/scalar at the recipient end are just scalars and do not pose any issue, as the final point/scalar pair is entirely controlled by the recipient. The point targeted by the sender at the first node in the receiver-provided partial route is no different from the final point that the sender would have targeted if it knew exactly who the receiver is.They debate the idea of whether the sender should generate the blinding factors in a decorrelated PTLC-based payment for path privacy or if the receiver should provide them to a partial path as well. They ultimately agree that it is safe for the receiver to provide blinding factors to a partial path. ZmnSCPxj shares this insight with Subhra Mazumdar.
Updated on: 2023-06-03T00:03:06.817036+00:00