Blind paths revisited



Summary:

The email conversation between Subhra Mazumdar and ZmnSCPxj discusses the issue of privacy and security in anonymous multi-hop locks. Subhra raises concerns about relying entirely on the sender for sampling the secrets as well as generating the PTLC, as it might lead to vulnerabilities if the sender has malicious intent and wants honest parties to suffer. ZmnSCPxj argues that if both the sender and receiver are corrupted, there is no security or privacy possible, and the payment is already totally compromised. The forwarding nodes cannot be attacked easily as they advertise themselves in order to be forwarded through. When considering privacy, it is the payment as a whole that needs to have privacy, and if the sender leaks who it is paying to, it results in the entire loss of privacy. However, the exact receiver node has to be known by the sender currently, which may result in layer-crossing shenanigans being performed. The proposal to have a receiver provide a partial, blinded path gives the receiver better privacy protection against the sender. The blinding factors in a decorrelated PTLC-based payment may be generated by the sender for path privacy, but it is safe for the receiver to provide blinding factors to a partial path as well.


Updated on: 2023-06-02T23:59:19.384804+00:00