Author: ZmnSCPxj 2018-04-15 13:35:55
Published on: 2018-04-15T13:35:55+00:00
The discussion is about incentivizing honest nodes and avoiding DOS attacks in Lightning Network. The author suggests changing commitment transactions to be asymmetrical, delaying only the output of the node holding the commitment transaction. The concern is that if both sides are delayed, dishonest nodes can perform unilateral closes to lock up the other side's coins, disrupting the network. The author explains how this attack would be easier to perform under a symmetrical delay commitment transaction scheme and provides an example of how it could be done costlessly. The author also discusses the possibility of passive attacks under an asymmetric delay scheme but argues that they are less harmful than active attacks under a symmetrical delay scheme.
Updated on: 2023-05-24T23:15:02.485714+00:00