Author: David A. Harding 2023-09-18 00:12:45+00:00
Published on: 2023-09-18T00:12:45+00:00
In this email, Dave raises a question about the scenario where both A and M are members of a group of thieves with control over a moderate amount of hash rate. The question is whether A can provide a "confirmed transaction" containing M's sign-only-once signature to B, and then generate a block before the CSV expiry that includes A's and M's signature over a different transaction that does not pay B.Dave suggests that if the CSV (Check Sequence Verify) is set for a significant amount of time in the future, the thieving group including A and M would not need to control a large amount of hash rate to have a high probability of success. This means that even if they were unsuccessful at the attempted theft, they might not lose anything and their theft attempt would be invisible to anyone outside their group.Furthermore, Dave mentions that if A is able to double spend back to herself funds that were previously intended for B, and if cut-through transactions were created where B allocated those same funds to C, the double spend would invalidate the cut-through. Therefore, Dave believes that the entire mechanism collapses into reputational trust in M, similar to the historic GreenAddress.it co-signing mechanism.It is important to note that the email does not provide any links or additional context to support these claims or provide further information.
Updated on: 2023-09-18T01:54:56.792540+00:00