Trustless 2-way-peg without softfork



Summary:

The second article in the email discusses proofs for the Nash equilibrium for the protocol model. The author provides a detailed explanation of how to prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this particular model. The article introduces the concept of a protocol game, which is a mathematical representation of interactions between multiple agents in a distributed system.The author starts by defining the protocol model and its basic components, such as players, strategies, and payoffs. They then explain the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a set of strategies where no player can unilaterally deviate and improve their payoff. The article emphasizes the importance of proving the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in order to ensure the stability and efficiency of the protocol model.To prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium, the author introduces the concept of best response dynamics, where each player iteratively chooses a strategy that maximizes their payoff given the strategies chosen by other players. The article explains how this iterative process converges to a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions.The author also discusses the concept of potential games, which are a special class of games where the difference in payoffs between any two strategies depends only on the difference in the number of players who choose those strategies. They explain how potential games provide a useful framework for proving the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the protocol model.The article includes several examples and case studies to illustrate the concepts and techniques discussed. It also provides links to additional resources and research papers for further reading. Overall, the article provides a comprehensive overview of the proofs for the Nash equilibrium in the protocol model and offers valuable insights for researchers and practitioners in the field of game theory and distributed systems.


Updated on: 2023-09-11T01:55:09.031671+00:00