Author: Filippo Merli 2021-09-10 09:30:31
Published on: 2021-09-10T09:30:31+00:00
In a discussion about the Braidpool proposal on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, a user raises concerns about a miner's incentive to not reference other miners' shares in their own shares. This would allow them to keep the reward for themselves without sharing with others, making the pool unprofitable for good miners. Additionally, the issue of conflict resolution is discussed, with two possible methods presented: using the longest chain or the chain with the most work. However, both methods have their own issues, such as the potential for a miner to create multiple low-difficulty shares and then publish higher-difficulty shares to claim the reward. The conversation then shifts to the centralization of Braidpool's payout server, which is seen as a single point of failure. While the paper claims to use Tor hidden service to protect against DDoS attacks, it does not protect against accidents or natural disasters that could take down the hub. The suggestion is made to use multiple hubs to reduce the risk of a single point of failure. One idea presented is a Lightning model where multiple hubs offer liquidity to the network, and the winning hasher elects one of the hubs to receive the payout. However, this may complicate the design, and it is acknowledged that getting something working now may be more beneficial than waiting for a perfect solution.
Updated on: 2023-06-15T01:17:50.808766+00:00