Published on: 2020-09-24T00:19:48+00:00
The conversation between Tom and ZmnSCPxj focuses on the security of statechains and compares them to other trust-minimized protocols such as TumbleBit and Wasabi. Statechains aim to replicate the speed of a centralized mixer while making theft more difficult, providing proof of ownership/theft and privacy guarantees. However, ZmnSCPxj argues that the slowness of other protocols is due to gathering enough participants for anonymity, rather than security. They suggest that if the statechain entity itself does not participate, a waiting period would still be necessary to gather enough participants, defeating the goal of speed. Furthermore, if the statechain entity does participate, it can outright steal funds. ZmnSCPxj suggests that the SwapMarket plan by Chris Belcher may provide better security with fewer confirmations of transactions.The discussion between Tom and ZmnSCPxj revolves around the security risks of non-custodial solutions. While Tom emphasizes the importance of non-custodiality for trust minimization and avoiding regulatory implications, ZmnSCPxj highlights the technical risks associated with it. They compare the security of a solution using a Secure Enclave (SE) for mixing protocols to other trust-minimized protocols like TumbleBit or Wasabi. ZmnSCPxj points out that even with an honest SE, hardware corruption can lead to the recovery of old private keys and violation of trust assumptions. They suggest withdrawing after every round and seeking multiple SEs to reduce risks. ZmnSCPxj concludes that while the SE solution may be superior in terms of block space, it is inferior in financial security.In a technical discussion on non-custodiality, ZmnSCPxj argues that trust minimization is the main objective, along with legal and regulatory implications. They suggest avoiding the term "custodial" and focusing on technical risks instead. ZmnSCPxj states that a service is non-custodial if it performs the protocol as specified, but there is still a risk of theft due to corrupted hardware. They highlight that older solutions like TumbleBit or Wasabi cannot lead to outright theft of coins even with cooperation from previous participants. ZmnSCPxj suggests that multiple mixing rounds under the proposed solution increase the risk of theft and withdrawing after each round would be better risk-wise.A team is designing an off-chain coin-swap protocol to work with the statechain implementation. The objective is to enable users to transact peer-to-peer off-chain, mixing their coins for privacy while remaining in custody of their assets. The swapping service, or conductor, would coordinate the swap among a group of statecoins without having control over the coins. To ensure privacy, a blind signature scheme similar to zerolink protocol would be used. However, assigning blame in case of a failed multi-party coinswap is challenging. One potential solution is for each sender to generate a zero-knowledge proof to assign blame, but this may add computational burden to user wallets. The team welcomes comments and is open to providing more details.The conversation between Tom and ZmnSCPxj discusses the concept of non-custodiality and its implications. Tom argues that non-custodiality is important for trust minimization and avoiding regulatory issues. ZmnSCPxj agrees but points out the technical risks involved. They suggest that a service is considered non-custodial if it follows the protocol specifications, but the risk of theft remains due to corrupted hardware. They compare this to other solutions like TumbleBit or Wasabi that cannot lead to the outright theft of coins. ZmnSCPxj highlights the increased exposure to theft with multiple rounds of the proposed solution and suggests withdrawing after each round for better risk management.The conversation revolves around the proposed protocol called 'statecoin'. It is a UTXO that can be transferred off-chain and requires trust in the Secure Enclave (SE). While the scheme offers advantages like faster and cheaper transactions, there are concerns about custodiality. ZmnSCPxj argues that if users have to trust the SE to not steal funds, it is not truly non-custodial. They argue that the main point of non-custodiality is trust minimization. They also discuss the statecoin scheme proposed by Tom, which involves a 2-of-2 UTXO between the owner and the SE. However, ZmnSCPxj points out that a corrupted SE can collude with other participants to take control of the coin and prevent the user from spending it freely.The email thread discusses the design of an off-chain coin-swap protocol for statecoins. The goal is to enable peer-to-peer off-chain transactions while ensuring coins remain in the custody of their owners. The swapping service, or conductor, does not have custody of the coins but coordinates the swap among statecoins. A blind signature scheme similar to zerolink protocol is used for privacy.
Updated on: 2023-08-02T02:39:39.216141+00:00