Author: Christian Decker 2019-09-19 10:26:13
Published on: 2019-09-19T10:26:13+00:00
The discussion revolves around the idea of an escape hatch in the scripts that allows spending any output attached to the settlement transaction by n-1 participants, which could be reclaimed into a new open right away. However, this would have to be very carefully designed as the entire point of requiring an n-of-n signature is to prevent Sybil attacks. The n-1 participants would have to be limited in what they can do, and if the only "right" they have is to force the nth participant to claim its funds on-chain, then that is implementable with a pre-signed transaction. The writer does not want to support uncooperative splice-outs due to their need to either pre-sign a splice-out of the party or encumber whatever is built on top to do a fast-reopen. However, there is value in exploring options. The privacy guarantees remain identical to Bitcoin on-chain, but combining this with allowing multiilateral kick-out of an unresponsive member defeats the point entirely. This also adds complexity in identifying the co-owner of an output. Claiming ownership would involve providing a valid input script that could spend the output under some condition, and others would have to verify this proof-of-ownership before accepting the node's self-splice-out. Overall, it is a lot of complexity for very little benefit.
Updated on: 2023-06-13T21:15:11.536450+00:00