Reconciling the off-chain and on-chain models with eltoo



Summary:

In a Lightning-dev mailing list, ZmnSCPxj proposed ideas for the cooperative and uncooperative closing of channels, membership changes, mining rewards, privacy, and liveness in multi-party off-chain payment mechanisms. For cooperative close, parties mutually agree to finalize the outputs from the most recent channel output state with low on-chain fees. The closing of an outer mechanism does not require the close of any hosted update mechanisms. In contrast, parties can splice out uncooperative members through a channel splicing transaction, but this is currently considered unsafe. To address liveness issues, signers can pre-sign updates committing their own outputs or have contingent tap-leafs to splice out non-responsive signers. Privacy concerns can be addressed by using Tor to disassociate IP addresses from signers, mix mechanisms to allow individual signers to disassociate funds ownership from identity, and using SIGHASH_ALL for cooperative closes. Finally, there are no equivalent concepts for multi-party channels regarding mining and difficulty adjustment.


Updated on: 2023-06-13T21:14:57.756642+00:00