Author: Ruben Somsen 2019-09-11 04:58:57
Published on: 2019-09-11T04:58:57+00:00
In a discussion between Ruben and ZmnSCPxj, the former asserted that there is no security difference between committing or not committing the utreexo hash into a block. ZmnSCPxj countered that invalid inflation can fool the SPV node, whereas the full node will not be fooled. To this, Ruben agreed but explained that his goal in the comparison was to establish that committing the hash adds no security. Ruben added that other weaknesses compared to full nodes are that SPV nodes rely on a healthy network of utreexo-supporting full nodes, at least one honest block needs to be mined, and consensus slows down because honest minority participation is required to produce a block. In response to Ruben's statement that both full nodes and SPVs need valid PoW to be fooled, ZmnSCPxj pointed out that in the event of a sybil attack, a full node will stall and think the blockchain has no more miners, while an SPV will follow the false blockchain. ZmnSCPxj suggested that automated payment processing systems using a full node will refuse to acknowledge incoming payments, leading to noisy complaints from clients but warning the payment processor of the possibility of an attack. He also recommended implementing a timeout to alert higher-layer management systems when a full node is unable to see a new block for six hours. However, automated payment processing systems using an SPV with PoW fraud proofs will be able to see incoming payments and release products in exchange for payment, making them vulnerable to attacks where the automated system is sybilled, and false payments are given on the attack chain, which are double-spent on the global consensus chain.
Updated on: 2023-06-13T21:17:30.375179+00:00