Author: Paul Sztorc 2017-09-09 15:33:28
Published on: 2017-09-09T15:33:28+00:00
The email thread discusses some agreements and disagreements related to sidechains. The writer agrees with Zmn on certain points including the header of a sidechain being defined by bits of data in mainchain headers, miner-voting accomplishing the same task as any SPV Proof and sidechains needing to be merged-mined. However, the writer disagrees with Zmn's point about unifying merge mining and WT^ validity voting as it causes sidechain headers on mainchain (SHOM) to regress to mere extension blocks, taking on negative properties of extension blocks. They also disagree with Zmn's belief that the power to decide the validity of a sidechain lies with the economic majority rather than miners. The writer believes 51% miner-group can pay bribes to themselves and orphan any block or txn that disagrees with them. Regarding SHOM, there is no reason to believe that the quantity "total amount of money available for withdrawal in a given time" will always be smaller than "sum of 288 bribes". The behavior of miners on Bcash and Bitcoin suggests that some are interested more in short-term profits than long-term. The writer has not seen a good explanation of how drivechain WT^ validity voting works in detail but documentation is available. The writer thinks lockboxes should have fixed value enforced by either sidechain or mainchain to be debated further.Sidechains may first be deployed as federated peg, then at some sidechain height, the federation may announce a move to drivechain/sidechain-headers-on-mainchain. The move from federated to economic-majority-controlled would involve the federation moving its controlled lockboxes to OP_WITHDRAWPROOFVERIFY lockboxes. Sidechain hardforks would be very contentious, with only one clear winner that can unlock lockboxes. The writer believes part of sidechain design must be the understanding that sidechains must never be hardforked, and only softforked. The mechanism that supports sidechains supports any financial system, including centralized, non-blockchain ones. The h* commitments can be made into commitments to the financial system's state, making it an implementation of CoinWitness, without using zk-SNARKs and instead using some mainchain-voted proof, where validity is judged by how much maincoin was sacrificed to advance that proof. The writer does not want ultra-easy, completely-permissionless creation of sidechains as miners (and therefore, users) may NOT desire the EXPECTED behavior of the sidechain.
Updated on: 2023-05-20T03:46:44.683588+00:00