Does Bitcoin require or have an honest majority or a rational one? (re rbf)



Summary:

In a discussion between Yancy and Jeremy Rubin, they explore the concept of honest behavior in Bitcoin and how it relates to rational decision making. They discuss scenarios where miners may choose to repack transactions from previously mined blocks for greater profit, rather than following the "honest tip mining" strategy of building on the longest chain. The two exchange views on whether an assumption of an honest majority or a rational majority is necessary for the network to function properly. Yancy questions how fee sharing would be organized if there were two conflicting tips, and whether bribes from one miner to the next could influence which tip is chosen. Meanwhile, Rubin suggests that defining an honest behavior can create a higher utility system, even if it isn't the most rational choice.They both agree that it might be useful to more tightly document Bitcoin's assumptions and their implications for the network's properties. Overall, the discussion centers around the importance of understanding and balancing the interplay between honesty and rationality within the Bitcoin ecosystem.In a recent post on the Bitcoin-dev mailing list, Jeremy Rubin discussed the assumptions made about the majority of Bitcoin users. He notes that while there is a common assumption of rationality among the majority, there is also a minority who may act irrationally or dishonestly. This assumption applies to both the costs associated with mining rewards and the cost of electricity.Rubin goes on to clarify that Satoshi did not suggest that Bitcoin operates under a rational majority assumption, contrary to what some may believe. Although he acknowledges that these properties may seem similar, Rubin states that there are trivial counterexamples to this notion.Overall, Rubin's post highlights the nuances of assumptions made about the behavior of Bitcoin users and how they impact the functioning of the network.


Updated on: 2023-06-16T01:52:18.232188+00:00