Author: Jeremy Rubin 2022-10-17 19:02:01
Published on: 2022-10-17T19:02:01+00:00
In a discussion on the Bitcoin-dev mailing list, Russell O'Connor suggests that building a secure blockchain based on arbitrary rules is not reasonable. He argues that users need an incentive to follow the rules of the system, and that rules ought to form a Nash Equilibrium. O'Connor notes that honest behavior assumptions are acceptable as long as they are time-bounded and observable. Jeremy Rubin adds that Satoshi claimed that for Bitcoin to function properly, a majority of honest nodes are required. However, honesty is not clearly defined, and there are multiple behaviors one can describe as honest, which may or may not be economically rational. It is important to note that defining an honest behavior can create a higher utility system because most people are "law-abiding citizens" who might not be short-term rational. In addition, it is crucial to document Bitcoin's assumptions in practice and its properties, as well as pathways to weakening these assumptions without compromising the network's expected behaviors. The safety of 0conf is also discussed, with Rubin arguing that even in the presence of an honest majority, the safety of 0conf isn't assured given the potential of race conditions in the mempool. Ultimately, it is important to consider the impact of weakening assumptions on different subsystems of Bitcoin and how this could affect the fee market's longer-term viability.
Updated on: 2023-06-16T01:51:44.810009+00:00