Removing the Dust Limit



Summary:

In this conversation, there is a proposal to make all dust transactions invalid by some nodes. The author questions whether this would be a consensus change or not and wonders why only some nodes are being targeted. They argue that the important bit is for full nodes and suggest a compromise of keeping the dust transactions in secondary storage for full nodes and in a separate Merkle Tree for bridge servers. This would enhance performance and reduce the likelihood of exhausting a node with DoS attacks. However, the author fails to see how this would reduce processing compared to the idea of outright rejecting all dust transactions. They also note that worst-case behavior should always be considered when it comes to resistance against attacks. The author highlights that fullnode efficiency is crucial for maintaining security against attacks on SPV nodes and suggests that if the cost of fullnodes in the worst case increases, it may become feasible for miners to attack SPV nodes.


Updated on: 2023-06-15T00:47:35.061901+00:00