Progress on Miner Withholding [combined summary]



Individual post summaries: Click here to read the original discussion on the bitcoin-dev mailing list

Published on: 2020-10-09T00:16:40+00:00


Summary:

In a discussion on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, Mike Brooks agrees with Pieter Wuille's concerns about the impact of the FPNC idea on CPU consumption and the electorate. He argues that the "getdata" message is a problem for operators and suggests that the threshold for a patch may be too high. Mike believes that FPNC can rebalance incentives and resolve abuses that reshape the electorate, leading to a more decentralized and fair network than the current "first seen" approach.Pieter Wuille responds to Mike, pointing out that Greg Maxwell is not part of the conversation and clarifying that the discussion mainly revolves around a DoS attack report, which was ultimately a mistake.The discussion thread focuses on two proposed changes to address the issues of miner withholding attacks and network decentralization. The current problem is that miners have an incentive to withhold blocks to gain an advantage in calculating the next block, resulting in a centralized network and transaction delays. The proposed solution involves rebalancing selfish-mining incentives, faster block creation times, and implementing FPNC. However, ZmnSCPxj warns about the reintroduction of selfish mining attacks if FPNC is implemented, making it a hard NAK. Despite the risks, proponents argue that the proposed changes will benefit the network and users.The article explains that the miner withholding attack is a significant issue in the Bitcoin network, leading to centralization and delays in transactions. FPNC is proposed as a solution, introducing a floating-point fitness value for each block to enable fair disagreement resolution and reduce the incentive to withhold blocks. By speeding up block formation time and maintaining inflation targets, the impact of malignant miners can be mitigated. The proposed changes aim to reduce unfair advantages given to large mining pools and promote honest mining practices.The author discusses the miner withholding attack and FPNC, highlighting the unintended incentive it creates for miners to hold onto blocks. Withholding blocks gives major mining pools an unfair advantage, contributes to centralization, and delays transactions. The proposed solution, FPNC, is considered a hard NAK due to the risk of reintroducing selfish mining attacks. The author suggests raising the threshold to 33% as a potential solution.Mike Brooks reveals that the idea for FPNC came from a conversation with ZmnSCPxj regarding re-org stability. After discussing with ZmnSCPxj and Greg Maxwell, it was agreed that the current problems facing the network are more significant than theoretical ones. Pieter Wuille clarifies that the discussion primarily revolves around a DoS attack report that turned out to be a mistake.


Updated on: 2023-08-02T02:45:54.122147+00:00