Author: Adam Back 2013-10-10 15:06:03
Published on: 2013-10-10T15:06:03+00:00
In a conversation with an unknown recipient, Adam Back suggests that fixing the ambiguity in the asn.1 level is not necessary to have conditional payments using not yet broadcast txid outputs as inputs to work with high assurance. He also notes that even if a new crypto level malleability is discovered in ECDSA, it remains secure. In response to this conversation, Adam Back proposes a more generic and robust way of fixing the issue by changing the txid from H(sig,inputs,outputs,script) to H(pubkey,inputs,outputs,script), or something similar. This would ensure that the malleability of the signature mechanism does not affect the security of conditional payments.
Updated on: 2023-06-07T17:33:42.105847+00:00