Electrum security model concerns [combined summary]

• Electrum security model concerns Mike Hearn 2012-11-16 17:44:32+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Mike Hearn 2012-11-16 15:59:45+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Gregory Maxwell 2012-11-15 23:45:09+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Mike Hearn 2012-10-10 15:55:44+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Gregory Maxwell 2012-10-10 15:23:25+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Gary Rowe 2012-10-10 14:06:29+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Mike Hearn 2012-10-10 11:19:00+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Gregory Maxwell 2012-10-09 03:22:01+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Mike Hearn 2012-10-08 11:52:26+00:00
• Electrum security model concerns Gregory Maxwell 2012-10-06 16:37:20+00:00

Published on: 2012-11-16T17:44:32+00:00

Summary:

In a conversation, the handling of wallet state in the presence of re-orgs is a concern. Transactions are checked to appear in the blockchain, but it is unclear if the wallet will be in the right state during a chain switch. A message from Thomas implies that there is no re-org handling at all. The conversation then shifts to a comparison between Electrum and MultiBit in terms of their handling of SPV work. The speaker asks how they differ beyond deterministic wallet seeding. Another conversation discusses the challenges of finding someone trustworthy and capable to work on the bitcoin.org website and emphasizes the need for better communication and understanding within the community to avoid conflicts. In an email thread, various issues related to Bitcoin are discussed, including concerns about the security model of Electrum and the importance of effectively communicating transaction confidence to users. The conversation also touches upon the challenges of developing and promoting Bitcoin. The conversation revolves around the functionality and potential risks of Electrum as a thin client, with a focus on its merchant daemon. The unauthenticated cleartext JSON protocol between clients and servers is mentioned, as well as the difficulty in communicating transaction confidence to users. The conversation highlights the need for clear explanations and appropriate caution for clients and security models on bitcoin.org. Another discussion addresses the security implications of thin clients, particularly Electrum, and the lack of awareness among users about the associated risks. The conversation emphasizes the need for better security features in client models and improved communication to prevent negative press for Bitcoin. The author of a message requests a proper discussion on understanding the bitcoinj security model. They have rewritten and extended a page on the subject, linking to the ETH paper, and highlight the differences between Electrum and bitcoinj in terms of user and app developer focus. The future divergence of software used by end-users and merchants is predicted, making it easier to tailor documentation to each demographic. Additionally, optimizations such as bloom filtering and better peer selection logic may render Electrum-type services obsolete. Concerns are raised about the security model of Electrum, as the website lacks detailed information and makes factually incorrect claims. A proper discussion is needed to avoid misunderstandings and encourage safer user behaviors. The bitcoinj security model is also critiqued for false claims regarding detecting double spends, emphasizing the need for a thorough examination of Electrum's security model.

Updated on: 2023-08-01T03:58:45.909360+00:00