Author: Peter Todd 2022-11-05 02:35:03
Published on: 2022-11-05T02:35:03+00:00
In an email to the Bitcoin-dev mailing list, Suhas Daftuar repeated a point he made on GitHub regarding mempool policy in the Bitcoin Core project. He commends AJ for their observations about how the views on mempool policy are changing in discussions around `-mempoolfullrbf`. Daftuar poses a hypothetical question to those who argue for making fullrbf a default policy on the network or offering a flag for users to enable fullrbf. He asks what would happen if the v3 transaction policy proposal was deployed, which restricts the ways that outputs of a v3 transaction can be spent while the transaction is unconfirmed. He suggests that in a few years someone might propose disabling the flag, which could lead to miners earning more revenue by allowing multiple descendant v3 transactions. Daftuar then frames the question differently, asking why miners and others should be prevented from experimenting with incentives around `fullrbf`, given potential incentives around a hypothetical `-disable_v3_transaction_enforcement` flag. Yanking the `mempoolfullrbf` flag from Bitcoin Core v24.0 puts a temporary roadblock in the face of full-rbf and prevents designing mechanisms like v3 blind without seeing how incentives play out fully. The experimentation cannot take place on testnet because incentives do not work properly when there is no money at stake. Proposed reversion pull-reqs do not leave the option for testnet anyway. Therefore, the only choice left is to release a full-rbf option and see what happens on mainnet.
Updated on: 2023-06-16T02:20:55.063758+00:00