Author: Federico Tenga 2017-11-30 09:37:57
Published on: 2017-11-30T09:37:57+00:00
The email conversation amongst members of the bitcoin-dev mailing list is discussing a proposal to change the fee structure in order to reduce the cost of running a node. The main concern with this proposal is that miners can still spam the network for free even if high sat/byte levels are implemented. They can still spam the chain for free and increase the cost of running a node. This issue was previously discussed in an article by Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, and Aviv Zohar, which proposed redesigning Bitcoin's fee market.William Morriss proposes an economic approach to maximize total fee collection and hash power. The proposal aims to maximize total transaction fees, reduce pending transaction time and individual transaction fees. The current supply curve is inelastic as it represents miner's willingness to accept transactions. The proposal suggests removing the block size limit and allowing miners to implicitly choose the market sat/byte rate with the cheapest-fee transaction included in their block. Excess transaction fees are refunded to the inputs. Miners will make decisions to maximize their block-reward profit and ignore low-fee transactions because they would shave the profits of their other transactions and increase their hash time. Users and services are free to bid higher transaction fees to reach the next block since their excess bid will be refunded. The block size limit was added as a spam-prevention measure, but anti-spam is built into the marginal system without the need for an explicit limit. Rarely, sections of the backlog would become large enough to be profitable, resulting in two markets: a backlog market and a real-time market. Low-fee transactions will eventually confirm, giving them a liveness property not previously enjoyed.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T22:22:11.115194+00:00