Author: Andrew Poelstra 2014-11-03 17:54:59
Published on: 2014-11-03T17:54:59+00:00
The discussion revolves around the distinction between hardness and likelihood of successful attack. The Appendix B talks about producing compact SPV proofs that are hard to forge and very unlikely to be forgeries. However, due to space constraints, it was not explored in great depth as desired. The fraudulent transfer can happen without reorganization if an attacker produces a fake SPV proof. It is not similar to double-spending, and the attacker doesn't need to own coins to perform this attack. In the absence of reorganization, the false proof will be invalidated by proof of longer work on the real chain. There is still a real cost to producing the false proof.
Updated on: 2023-06-09T03:21:53.235278+00:00