Author: Peter Todd 2013-11-15 10:58:37
Published on: 2013-11-15T10:58:37+00:00
The email conversation discusses the correct strategy for a miner to get more blocks than their competition. The suggested strategy is to withhold the block to increase expected revenue, where if the cabal chooses not to broadcast its secret chain until at least the next block, its expected revenue after the next block is found may increase. However, the formula for withholding the chain depends on q, the fraction of total hashing power, n, the number of blocks ahead on a secret branch, r_tot, the mined coins, and r_next, the next block's reward. If the cabal seeks only to maximize immediate revenue, then it will withhold its chain if q > 1 - (1 + r_tot / r_next)^(-1/n). If the cabal has just mined his first block off the public chain, i.e., n = 1, and if the block reward is relatively stable, i.e., r_next = r_tot, then it needs q > 50% to profitably withhold. The email also mentions that as the miner wins the race and withholds again, he must grow q to compensate for the increase in r_tot, and any decrease in n. Finally, the email suggests that the value of the blocks found should be weighed against the risk that someone else catches up, and when it makes sense, some or all blocks should be published.
Updated on: 2023-06-07T19:35:02.239257+00:00