Author: Alan Reiner 2013-11-04 21:45:24
Published on: 2013-11-04T21:45:24+00:00
In this email thread, the topic of selfish mining is discussed. It is suggested that a miner with exceptionally good knowledge of the state of the network and high connectivity to other miners can keep newly mined blocks a secret and broadcast them only after another miner finds a block, in order to orphan the other miner's chain and increase their own revenue. However, it is argued that this strategy may not be profitable in practice due to the need for well-connectedness in all miners and the ability to randomize the order of broadcasts. Additionally, the use of deterministic pseudo-random mechanisms for choosing between competing chains can alleviate concerns about rational motivations of individual miners. The possibility of de-incentivizing selfish mining by randomizing the order of broadcasts and the idea that practicing instead of theorizing may be more useful are also mentioned. Finally, various factors such as latency, nLockTime, and the centralization of pools and mining hardware are discussed in relation to the profitability of selfish mining strategies.
Updated on: 2023-06-07T19:08:31.628519+00:00