Author: Lloyd Fournier 2020-05-12 06:10:47
Published on: 2020-05-12T06:10:47+00:00
A new protocol has been developed which combines two existing ideas and one new idea to create a practical and theoretical protocol. The first idea is from monero atomic swap, where the refund transaction on one chain is dependent on the refund on the other using secret revelation. The second idea involves making the decryption key your signing key in the multisig with an adaptor signature so that when the key is revealed with the adaptor signature, the other party gains full knowledge of the private key for the output and can spend it arbitrarily. The combination of these two ideas solves the problem of unconstrained spending power over an output not being useful if there is a pre-signed refund transaction spending from it. However, a new problem arises where the party with the timelock never refunds, locking the funds forever. This problem is solved by extending the standard *TLC contract to create a "Forced Refund *TLC" where Alice must claim the refund or lose her money, forcing the refund secret revelation through punishment. If Alice refuses to refund, Bob gets the asset he wanted anyway.The resulting protocol from applying these ideas involves three transactions, with one party having their funds in a non-HD key output. The four-transaction protocol is considered a strict improvement over the four transaction protocol, with one of the chains not requiring a timelock. Ruben also presents a two-transaction protocol that involves revocation and relative timelocks. The advantages of Ruben's two-transaction protocol are that timelocks and monitoring are only needed on one of the chains.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T01:30:28.001090+00:00