Author: Peter Todd 2017-05-28 21:07:57
Published on: 2017-05-28T21:07:57+00:00
The email conversation between Paul Sztorc and Peter Todd discusses the requirement or incentive of miners to upgrade to prevent theft from a sidechain. While Sztorc believes that this incentive does not affect miners relative to each other, Todd argues that if a miner has better capabilities to prevent theft, they may induce it to push other miners off the network. Todd also brings up the issue of rejecting withdrawals, which could lead to political risks for miners and prevent users from getting their money, giving other miners a reason to kick them off Bitcoin entirely. Todd questions why miners are being forced to run this code and suggests using semi-trusted methods to supplement their decision-making process.Todd also emphasizes the dubious security model of drivechains and argues that Bitcoin is more valuable if miners ensure that drivechains fail. He proposes user-activated soft-forks to ensure this failure and highlights his approach to involve miners as little as possible in the consensus. Todd questions the use-cases for drivechains and suggests safer client-side validation instead.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T00:58:57.874647+00:00